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PREVIEW — Denezpi v. United States (2022). Double Jeopardy in
Indian Country
Paul Hutton*
The Supreme Court of the United States scheduled oral arguments for
February 22, 2022, beginning at 10:00 a.m. Arguments in Denezpi v.
United States will be heard immediately following the conclusion of the
first scheduled argument. The arguments will be presented in the United
States Supreme Court Building in Washington, D.C. Solicitor General
Elizabeth B. Prelogar will likely argue for the United States. Michael B.
Kimberly will likely argue for Denezpi.
I. INTRODUCTION
The single issue before the Court in Denezpi v. United States is
whether a Court of Indian Offenses constitutes a federal entity, and
therefore, separate prosecutions in federal district court and a Court of
Indian Offenses for the same act violates the Double Jeopardy Clause as
prosecutions for the “same offense.”1 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit upheld Merle Denezpi’s federal district court
prosecution.2 The court found the authority for his earlier Court of Indian
Offenses guilty plea at Ute Mountain Ute Agency3 stemmed from tribal
inherent sovereignty, not federal authority.4 As such, the 10th Circuit held
that Denezpi’s two convictions were prosecuted by separate sovereigns
and the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply.5
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects
individuals from successive punishments and prosecutions by declaring
that no person shall be “twice put in jeopardy of life or limb” for the “same
offense.”6 Under the so-called Blockburger test, if a second prosecution
involves proving the exact same elements as the first, the two offences are
the same and double jeopardy bars the second prosecution.7
*
Paul Hutton, Juris Doctor Candidate 2023, Alexander Blewett III
School of Law at the University of Montana.
1.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2.
U.S. v. Denezpi, 18-CR-00267-REB-JMC, 2019 WL 295670 (D.
Colo. Jan. 23, 2019).
3.
Crim. Min. Order at 1, United States v Denezpi, No. 2017-703-CR.
(Court of Indian Offenses Dec. 6, 2017).
4.
United States v. Denezpi, 979 F.3d 777, 784 (10th Cir. 2020).
5.
Id.
6.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7.
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); United
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993).
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A significant exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause is the dualsovereignty doctrine which provides “that two sovereigns, which derive
their power from different sources, may individually or both prosecute an
offender for an infraction arising from the same conduct which violates
the laws of each.”8 The doctrine has been cemented into American
jurisprudence and continually upheld by the Court,9 including being
applied to tribal courts.10 In United States v. Wheeler,11 the Court held that
tribal “primeval sovereignty” was never taken away, and when tribes
exercise their criminal jurisdiction they do so “as part of its retained
sovereignty and not as an arm of the Federal Government.” The court
made clear that this decision did not encompass whether a Court of Indian
Offense (“CFR Court”) is “an arm of the Federal Government” or if it
derives its power “from the inherent sovereignty of the tribe.”12
While it is clear that the dual-sovereignty doctrine applies to tribal
courts, it remains unclear if the dual-sovereignty exception applies to CFR
Courts.13 The Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) established the CFR
Courts in 1883 to assimilate tribes according to federal policy at the time.14
The CFR Courts adjusted considerably over the next 140 years and today
strive “to provide adequate machinery for the administration of justice for
Indian tribes.”15 CFR Courts have jurisdiction over “any action”
committed by an Indian in Indian Country, but those actions must be made
a criminal offense under federal regulations or be a tribal law approved by
the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs.16 A CFR Court is usually limited
to sentencing a defendant to a maximum of one year of incarceration, but
some special circumstances allow for a maximum sentence of three
years.17
Federal regulations also control appointments and funding for the
CFR Courts. Prosecutors for CFR Courts are appointed by the
superintendent of the jurisdiction.18 Similarly, judges are appointed by the
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs but must be confirmed by a majority
of the tribal governing body.19 Further, funding for CFR Courts derives
from Congress and is funneled through the BIA's Tribal Justice Support
8.
Robert Matz, Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy Clause: If
at First You Don't Convict, Try, Try Again, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353, 359 (1997).
9.
See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985); Gamble v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1967 (2019).
10.
See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
11.
435 U.S. 328 (1978).
12.
Id.
13.
See generally, id.
14.
Justice Raymond D. Austin, American Indian Customary Law in the
Modern Courts of American Indian Nations, 11 WYO. L. REV. 351, 355 (2011) (citing
SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL
LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 175 (1994)).
15.
25 C.F.R. § 11.102 (2022).
16.
25 C.F.R. § 11.114; 25 C.F.R. § 11.108.
17.
25 C.F.R. § 11.114; 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (b) (2022).
18.
25 C.F.R. § 11.204.
19.
25 C.F.R. § 11.210.
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Office.20 Currently only 16 tribes use CFR Courts, and many are extremely
remote. For example, the Ute Mountain Ute CFR Court in Towaoc is 400
miles away from the nearest federal court.21
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2017, Merle Denezpi (“Denezpi”) and a companion known
as V.Y., both Navajo Nation members, drove from Teec Nos Pos, Arizona
in the Navajo Nation to Towaoc, Colorado in the Ute Mountain Ute Indian
Reservation.22 There, Denezpi and V.Y. went into Denezpi’s girlfriend’s
house where Denezpi used a 2x4 to barricade the door.23 Denezpi then
demanded that V.Y. have sex with him, and when she refused Denezpi
threatened V.Y. and forced her to engage in non-consensual sex.24 Later
that night, after Denezpi had fallen asleep, V.Y. escaped and eventually
reported the attack to tribal police.25 V.Y. then underwent a Sexual Assault
Nurse Exam that documented twenty-four injuries to her body.26
Tribal Police arrested Denezpi several days later and charged him
in CFR Court with “assault and battery under 6 Ute Mountain Ute Code §
2, and with terroristic threats and false imprisonment under 25 C.F.R. §§
11.402, 11.404.”27 Denezpi entered an Alford Plea28 and was released from
tribal custody “with credit for time served.”29
In 2020, a federal grand jury indicted Denezpi for violating one
count of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian Country.30 Denezpi filed a
motion to dismiss, contending that the indictment violated the Fifth
Amendment’s prohibition against double jeopardy because the CFR court
he was convicted in was “clearly an arm of the Federal Government,”
and thus not subject to the dual-sovereignty doctrine.31 The district court
denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the CFR Court which convicted
20.
Chief Judge Gregory D. Smith & Bailee L. Plemmons, The Court of
Indian Appeals: America's Forgotten Federal Appellate Court, 44 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 211, 222 (2020).
21.
Br. Amici Curiae of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Eastern Shawnee
Tribe of Oklahoma, and Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians in Support of the United
States at 2, Denezpi v. United States, No. 20-7622, (U.S. Jan. 18, 2022).
22.
United States. v. Denezpi, No. 18-cr-00267-REB-JMC, 2019 WL
295670, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2019).
23.
Gov’t’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2, United States v Denezpi,
No. 18-cr-00267-REB-JMC (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 2019).
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
United States v. Denezpi, 979 F.3d 777, 780 (10th Cir. 2020).
27.
Id.
28.
See generally, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (the
Court allowed for a guilty plea from the defendant while he maintained his innocence).
29.
Gov’t’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2, United States v.
Denezpi, No. 18-cr-00267-REB-DW (D. Colo. Jun 7, 2018).
30.
Indictment at 1, United States v. Denezpi, No. 18-cr-00267-JMC (D.
Colo. Jun. 7, 2018).
31.
Mot. to Dismiss at 4, United States v. Denezpi, No. 18-cr-00267REB-JMC. (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2019).
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Denezpi “was exercising the sovereign powers of the Ute Mountain Ute
Tribe and is not an arm of the federal government.”32 Denezpi was tried,
found guilty, and sentenced to 360 months in prison and ten years of
supervised release.33
Denezpi appealed his verdict to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.34 The Tenth affirmed the district court’s
decision on October 28, 2020.35 Denezpi petitioned for a writ of certiorari
which was granted on October 18, 2021.36
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The parties disagree on the single issue of whether the CFR Court
in which Denezpi was indicted during his first prosecution is derived from
federal authority. If so, Denezpi’s second prosecution was therefore for
the “same offence,” and thus barred by double jeopardy.
A. Petitioner’s Argument
Denezpi argues that after his first prosecution in a CFR Court, the
Fifth Amendment bars the United States from subsequently prosecuting
him in federal district court. Denezpi argues that the dual-sovereignty
doctrine does not apply because the CFR Court is an arm of the Federal
Government.37
1. The History and Current Status of CFR Courts
Denezpi asserts this case is a “straightforward violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause,” because the United States brought both criminal
cases against Denezpi for the “same course of conduct and for offenses
with entirely overlapping elements.”38 Denezpi contends the dualsovereignty doctrine does not apply to the situation at hand because the
CFR Courts and the district court derive their power to prosecute from the
same source—the United States federal government.39 Denezpi reasons
this is so because the CFR Courts are Article I courts which “reside within
the BIA,” and the judges, staff, and prosecutors who bring criminal cases
to the court “are all subject to exclusive federal control”; thus, the dualsovereignty doctrine does not apply.40

32.
United States. v. Denezpi, 18-cr-00267-REB-JMC, 2019 WL
295670, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2019).
33.
United States. v. Denezpi, 979 F.3d 777, 781 (10th Cir. 2020).
34.
Id.
35.
Id. at 779.
36.
Denezpi v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 395 (2021).
37.
Br. for Pet’r at 5, Denezpi v United States, No. 20-7622 (U.S. Dec 7,
2021).
38.
Id. at 14.
39.
Id. at 17.
40.
Id.
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Denezpi contends that CFR Courts were originally “constituted
under the authority of federal regulations” to assimilate the tribes.41 Thus,
the “wellsprings” of the CFR Courts’ power could not logically derive
from tribal sovereignty.”42 Denezpi further contends that the CFR Courts
were originally “run by the BIA Indian agent for each reservation,”43 and
BIA regulation required the appointment of judges whom “rejected tribal
customs.”44 Accordingly, Denezpi argues, the CFR Courts were created as
“purely federal instrumentalities to force federal law (and western cultural
norms) on the tribes.”45 Thus, the “only possible source of power to
prosecute crimes” is derived from federal sovereignty, not tribal.46
Denezpi then turns to the current operation of the CFR Courts,
arguing the CFR Courts remain “federal instrumentalities,” where federal
prosecutors have exclusive federal prosecutorial discretion.47 The BIA
continues to maintain discretion over the appointment of judges, and
prosecutors “work for and at the direction of the United States.”48 Denezpi
argues that there is no conceivable way a tribe can exercise sovereignty in
a CFR Court because a tribe retains little discretion to create or disband
CFR Courts.49 Denezpi also contends that orders and warrants issued by
the CFR Courts are “in the name and under the laws of the United States”
and do not require input from the tribes.50 Further, defendants sentenced
to a period of incarceration are remanded to federal custody, and fines are
paid to the federal treasury.51 Accordingly, the CFR Courts “remain
federal instrumentalities,” where federal prosecutors have exclusive
federal prosecutorial discretion, and tribes “have no relevant role in the
prosecution of crimes.”52 Therefore, the two prosecutions were both
brought by the United States, a “straightforward violation” of double
jeopardy, and the dual-sovereignty doctrine does not apply.53
2. CFR Courts’ Source of Authority

41.
Id. at 20.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 21 (quoting Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement, IM07-03, Tribal and State Jurisdiction to Establish and Enforce Child Support 10 (Mar.
12, 2007), https://perma.cc/V2MX-BEAK (2007 FOCSE Memo))) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Lindsay Cutler, Tribal Sovereignty, Tribal Court Legitimacy, and
Public Defense, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1765 (2016).
44.
Br. for Pet’r at 21, Denezpi v United States, No. 20-7622 (U.S. Dec
7, 2021) (quoting Office of Indian Affairs Annual report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, 28. (1892)).
45.
Id.
46.
Id. at 22.
47.
Id. at 23.
48.
Id. at 24 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 11.204 (2022)).
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 24–25 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2508(2)(A)).
51.
Id. at 25.
52.
Id. at 23.
53.
Id. at 25.
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Denezpi characterizes the Tenth Circuit’s holding that CFR
Courts “exercise tribal power” because they prosecute tribal crimes.54
Denezpi contends this is a logical fallacy because tribes cannot exercise
tribal sovereignty when federal prosecutions are undertaken in CFR
Courts unilaterally by the BIA.
Denezpi argues that the source of the law applied in a prosecution
is irrelevant to a double jeopardy analysis; only the source of the
sovereign’s authority matters.55 To Denezpi, CFR Court prosecutions are
“federal, regardless of the substantive law applied,”56 because BIA
prosecutions in CFR Courts are grounded in federal sovereignty.57
Denezpi argues this is the case because the BIA’s power to prosecute
“derives from the United States Code and the Code of Federal
Regulations.”58 Furthermore, Denezpi makes the argument that a federal
court does not “morph into an instrumentality” of a tribe every time it
enforces the substantive law of the tribe.59 Denezpi argues this is common
place in the civil context, in which federal district courts often apply state
civil codes in cases brought pursuant to diversity jurisdiction.60 In such
cases, Denezpi argues, the federal court does not “assume” state sovereign
power, but instead “exercises its own independent power.” The same
applies to state courts when they enforce federal law.61 Denezpi contends
that there is no difference when a federal court is “called upon” to enforce
a tribe’s criminal laws, and dual-sovereignty precedent has “consistently
required not only two offenses defined by separate sovereigns, but also
two prosecutions undertaken by separate sovereigns.”62 Thus, it is unlikely
in this case that “these truisms” will play out differently, as the Court’s
dual-sovereignty jurisprudence has required both two offenses defined by
separate sovereigns and subsequently two prosecutions by separate
sovereigns.
3. The Consequences of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision
Denezpi argues that the Tenth Circuit’s decision is not supported
by the practical purposes of the dual-sovereignty doctrine.63 One of these
purposes is to prevent a faster moving prosecutor from winning the
“sprint” to the courthouse and filing an indictment before a slower moving
54.
Id. at 25 (internal omissions and quotation marks omitted).
55.
Id. at 25–26 (there is “no case to support the proposition that a
single sovereign may prosecute a defendant twice in its own name and in its own
courts—first for a violation of another sovereign’s laws, and then a second time for a
substantively identical violation of its own laws”).
56.
Id. at 26.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 27 (citing Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 66
(2016)).
59.
Id.
60.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2021)).
61.
Id. (citing Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136–137 (1876)).
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 28.
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sovereign does.64 Denezpi contends this consideration is irrelevant here
because “the decision to prosecute both criminal cases is made by the same
sovereign,” as Congress has directed the U.S. Attorney’s Office to
coordinate with the BIA.”65 This interagency cooperation eliminates the
“sprint” to the courthouse that would validate an exception to the
traditional double jeopardy.66
Denezpi then contends the interests of the two sovereigns in
punishing the same act should not be of concern because the federal
government is making the “unilateral decision” to charge defendants in
both the CFR Courts and the district courts.67 Denezpi reasons that a tribal
prosecution in CFR Court likely does “not fully express the tribe’s true
interest in condemning the crime,” and many tribes would prefer federal
prosecutions under the Major Crimes Act to draw a harsher sentence.68
Thus, not recognizing the dual-sovereignty doctrine in this context does
not prevent the tribes from “vindicating their sovereign interest.”69
Last, Denezpi argues that the Tenth Circuit’s rationale would
authorize states “to pursue successive prosecutions by the same
prosecuting entities, in the same courts, for legally and factually identical
offenses.”70 Denezpi reasons that states could assert the first prosecution
was for a state offense reflecting state sovereignty and that a second
prosecution, for the same federal offense, was reflecting federal
sovereignty.71 Similarly, Denezpi argues, the federal government could
also “assume” the power to prosecute state criminal codes and then
prosecute the defendant twice in federal court for a substantively similar
federal crime.72
Denezpi concludes, that a single sovereign should only “‘get one
bite at the apple, not more’”;73 anything less subjects a defendant to
“continued ‘embarrassment, expense and ordeal’ and ‘compel[s] him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,’ in violation of one of
the most basic precepts of fairness in criminal procedure.”74

64.
Id. (citing Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985)) (“To deny a
State its power to enforce its criminal laws because another State has won the race to
the courthouse ‘would be a shocking and untoward deprivation of the historic right
and obligation of the States to maintain peace and order within their confines.’”)
(quoting Bartkus v. People of State of Ill., 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959)).
65.
Id. at 28 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2810(b)(1), (8) (2021)).
66.
Id. at 29.
67.
Id.
68.
Id at 30.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 30–31.
72.
Id. at 31.
73.
Id. at 32 (quoting Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969)).
74.
Id. (citing Benton, 395 U.S. at 796); (quoting Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
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B. Respondent’s Argument
The United States argues that the Court should affirm Denezpi’s
convictions. The United States contends that the dual-sovereignty doctrine
applies to this type of double prosecution as Denezpi violated two
sovereigns’ laws. The United States believes that the focus of the Court
should be on the source of the authority to prosecute Denezpi, not the
forum in which he was prosecuted. Further, the government contends that
holding otherwise would cause confusion in lower courts, potentially
leading to public safety concerns on reservations.75
1. Dual Sovereignty and Inherent Sovereignty
The United States points out that both the federal government and
the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe have criminalized sexual assault, and both the
tribe and the federal government maintain their “primeval sovereignty” to
prosecute an individual for breaking those laws.76 The United States
disputes Denezpi’s contention that the CFR Courts are transformed into
an entity of the federal government only because the BIA created them.77
Instead, the United States contends that the Ute Mountain Ute prosecution
of Denezpi in a CFR Court was vindicating its interest in maintaining
order, tribal customs, traditions, and relations among members.78
Similarly, the federal government was vindicating its interests by
prosecuting Denezpi in federal district court.79 Thus, the United States
reasons the “logic” in Wheeler shows that the ultimate source of authority
of a prosecution by a tribal government in CFR Court derives from the
“the inherent sovereignty of the tribe that enacted and defined the crime.”80
Therefore, both sovereigns, the federal government and Ute Mountain
Utes, were only able to vindicate each of their interests through
prosecuting Denezpi for the offense he committed against each of them.81
Next, The United States contends the only relevant factor for a
dual-sovereignty inquiry is the “sovereign’s authority for the criminal
prohibition,” and criterion such as “[t]he degree to which an entity . . .
submit[s] to outside direction” do not factor into the analysis.82 Thus,
because the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe “has the ‘primeval’ power to
prescribe laws and punish infractions of them,” it is a separate sovereign
from the United States.83 The United States contends it is insignificant if
75.
76.

Br. for the U.S. at 16–17, Jan. 11, 2022, No. 20 7622.
Id. at 22–23 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328

77.
78.
79
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 22–23.
Id.
Id. at 26 (quoting Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 67

83.

Id. at 26–27; see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978).

(1978)).

(2016)).
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the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe relies on “the machinery” of the CFR Courts
to prosecute crimes against the tribe.84 Instead, the United States argues
that without the Ute Mountain Ute’s tribal laws, there would be no
prosecution for a violation of the underlying law nor would the tribe use a
CFR Court to enforce the law, which are both exercises of the Tribe’s own
authority.85
The United States then contends that Denezpi’s interpretation that
double jeopardy would bar “successive prosecutions by the same
sovereign’s prosecutors,” is unfounded.86 The United States argues that
double jeopardy only bars prosecutors “from failing once . . . learn[ing]
from their mistakes, [and] trying again to secure a conviction.”87 The
United States furthers that while some lower courts have “suggested” a
potentially narrow exception exits in which one sovereign “manipulates”
another sovereign into bringing an indictment, it does not apply here. Even
if it did apply, the United States argues, the exception would not preclude
the federal prosecution in this case because nothing suggests the “Tribe’s
decision to utilize the Court of Indian Offenses for the enforcement of its
tribal ordinances ‘was so dominated, controlled, or manipulated . . . that it
did not act of its own volition.’”88
2. CFR Courts Source of Authority
The United States asserts that all branches of the government
recognize that the CFR Courts exercise tribal sovereignty.89 Furthermore
the early CFR Courts were “understood to exercise the tribes’ own
authority,” as tribes still enacted their own code as part of their retained
sovereignty and the CFR Courts did nothing to divest the tribes of that
heritage.90
Next, the United States explains that tribes have the authority to
establish their own tribal judicial system or administer their justice through
CFR Courts, but that choice is an “exercise of the tribe’s inherent
sovereignty.”91 When a tribe decides to retain a CFR Court, the United
States argues, the BIA only provides “adequate machinery for the
administration of Justice”92 while the tribe may select ordinances eligible
for enforcement, have a role selecting and removing judges, and have
control over other functions of the CFR Courts.93

84.
Id. at 27.
85.
Id. at 29.
86.
Id. at 30.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 32 (quoting United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354,
1361 (11th Cir. 1994)).
89.
Id. at 33.
90.
Id. at 35–36.
91.
Id. at 36.
92.
Id. (quoting 25 C.F.R. 11.102 (2022)).
93.
Id. at 36–37.
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Next, the United States argues Congress is not the source of tribal
government but merely regulates parts of tribal government.94 Thus, while
the federal government does fund and regulate sections of the CFR court,
it is the tribes that are the source of the CFR Courts’ power.95 The United
States contends that while the first prosecution was brought in the name of
the U.S., this is not determinative of which sovereign was the wellspring
for the power to bring that charge.96 Further, the United States contends
the caption of the pleadings is not determinative of a double jeopardy
inquiry and prosecutions are often brought in the name of the tribe.97
The United States then contends that ruling the dual-sovereignty
doctrine does not apply in this case would have negative and disruptive
effects on the judicial system throughout America.98 The United States
argues that if this carve out was implemented, courts would apply the
Blockburger test to “assess whether a tribal and federal crime are the ‘same
offence.’”99 The United States reasons the Blockburger test has proved
particularly difficult to administer and would become even more difficult
if courts were required to apply the test to the elements of tribal offenses
and federal crimes.100
3. The Consequences of Overturning the Tenth Circuit’s Decision
Finally, the United States argues that ruling for Denezpi would
damage tribal sovereignty and further harm one of the “most dangerous
places in the United States:” Indian Country.101 The United States argues
the consequences would include creating a two-tiered system among the
tribes, the first tier being the tribes who have created their own judicial
system and the other being the tribes that utilize the CFR Courts. The
United States argues that this approach would worsen crime in Indian
Country, and defendants like Denezpi, who was sentenced to only 140
days in prison, would get far milder sentences than needed.102 The United
States concludes by asking the Court to affirm the court of appeals.
V. ANALYSIS
This case involves a determination of whether CFR Courts, which
are the main source of judicial power for 16 tribes, derive their power from
the federal government or the tribes themselves. While the issue of
whether double jeopardy applies to subsequent prosecutions in tribal and
94.
Id. at 38 (citing United States. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978)).
95.
Id. at 38–39.
96.
Id. at 41.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 42.
99.
Id. (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
100. Id. at 43.
101. Id. (quoting Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla & Cupeño Indians v.
Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025, 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013)).
102. Id. at 44–45.
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federal court has been soundly decided in Wheeler, the Wheeler court was
explicit in not deciding if the same applies to CFR Courts.103
The Court is likely to examine the historical nature of the CFR
Courts and whether they are an arm of the federal government. The Court
is then likely to determine that the federal government’s and CFR Courts’
“powers derive from the same ‘ultimate source,” and Denezpi was put
twice in jeopardy.104
1. The Historical Significance of the Courts of Indian Affairs
The Court is likely to begin its analysis by looking towards the
“ultimate source” of power that CFR Courts derive their power from.105 In
order to accomplish this goal the Court “asks a narrow, historically
focused question,” to determine the origins of the jurisdictions in
question.106 While traditional tribal dispute mechanisms long pre-dated
European colonialism in North America,107 efforts to “assimilate” Native
Americans did not became federal policy in the United States until 1883.108
The Secretary of the Interior at the time, Henry Teller, recommended the
BIA create a set of civil and criminal rules “for use on Indian reservations
to end the Indians’ ‘savage and barbarous practices,’ which were ‘a great
hindrance to [their] civilization.’”109 The result of this directive was the
creation of the CFR Courts by the BIA in 1883.110 At the CFR Courts
inception, they unquestionably derived their power from federal
sovereignty as they were used to assimilate Native Americans “with the
majority white culture” in the United States.111 At their peak, CFR Courts
operated in about two-thirds of “reservations districts,” and continued to
punish conduct that “resisted acculturation and assimilation.”112
With the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, the
federal policies of allotment and assimilation were replaced with a new
policy of tribal self-determination.113 After the Indian Reorganization Act
103. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 n. 26 (1978) (“CFR
Courts, still exist on approximately 30 reservations . . . we need not decide today
whether such a court is an arm of the Federal Government or, like the Navajo Tribal
Court, derives its powers from the inherent sovereignty of the tribe.”).
104. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 62 (2016) (quoting
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320.
105. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328.
106. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. at 62.
107. Vincent C. Milani, The Right to Counsel in Native American Tribal
Courts: Tribal Sovereignty and Congressional Control, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279,
1280 (1994).
108. Austin, supra note 14, at 354.
109. Id. at 355 (quoting AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS:
WRITINGS BY THE “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN” 1880-1900, at 296 (Francis Paul Prucha
ed., 1973)).
110. Id.
111. Smith &. Plemmons, supra note 20 at 221.
112. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law;
Indian Law Symposium, 24 N.M.L. REV. 225, 235 (1994).
113. Id.
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was passed, CFR Courts still remained and were considered to be interim
courts until tribes could “authorize and operate their own courts.”114 This
policy has persisted and the current purpose of the federal regulations exist
to “provide adequate machinery for the administration of justice for Indian
tribes.”115 Almost every tribe in the nation has opted to create their own
tribal court system and currently only 16 tribes have CFR Courts.116 The
Indian Reorganization Act policy is the crux of the United States’
argument that the Ute Mountain Utes are now in fact exercising their tribal
sovereignty and acting within their own tribal interests by prosecuting
Denezpi. The United States, however, seems to ignore the historic
founding of the CFR Courts, which is undoubtedly federal.117 CFR Courts
are no longer meant to be the prominent form of justice on tribal land, but
instead a “stop-gap measure allowing a tribe to have a judicial branch until
that tribe elects to create its own court system.”118 From their inception
CFR courts were considered “blunt tools of assimilation wielded by the
federal government under the guise of federal regulation” to civilize tribal
governments.119 While neither Denezpi nor the United States dispute that
the CFR Courts have changed considerably since their inception, it is clear
that the CFR Courts’ historic creation was federal in nature and founded
with for the purpose of exercising federal authority.
2. Jurisprudence Demonstrates that CFR Courts Should be Considered
Federal Entities
The Court is likely to find that recent jurisprudence shows the
CFR Courts should be considered federal entities. In Puerto Rico v.
Sanchez Valle the court made clear that when determining “whether two
prosecuting authorities are different sovereigns for double jeopardy
purposes, this Court asks a narrow, historically focused question.”120 In
making this determination the Court does not ask how autonomous the
second entity is, but “whether the prosecutorial powers of the two
jurisdictions have independent origins—or, said conversely, whether those
powers derive from the same ‘ultimate source.’”121 Thus, it is likely the
114. Id. at 236.
115. 25 C.F.R. § 11.102 (2022).
116. United States Department of the Interior, COURT OF INDIAN
OFFENSES, https://perma.cc/TE47-W2G9 (last visited February 10, 2022).
117. See Smith &. Plemmons, supra note 20, at 119. ("The United States
Department of the Interior created the Court of Indian Offenses' jurisdiction through
federal Executive Branch regulation in the Code of Federal Regulations”); Cutler,
supra note 43, at 1795 (“These courts were blunt tools of assimilation wielded by the
federal government under the guise of federal regulation for the purpose of
“civiliz[ing]” the tribes.”); Austin, supra note 14, at 357 (“the Court of Indian
Offenses, despite its name, was not a court at all but a program established by the
federal government to “civilize” the Indians”).
118. Smith &. Plemmons, supra note 20, at 122.
119. Cutler, supra note 43, at 1765.
120. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 62 (2016).
121. Id. (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978)).
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Court will embark on a similar analysis as they did in Sanchez Valle, where
it held that Puerto Rico and the United States may not “successively
prosecute a single defendant for the same criminal conduct . . . because the
oldest roots of Puerto Rico's power to prosecute lie in federal soil.”122
The Court is likely to find that the CFR Courts are arms of the
federal government and thus the dual-sovereignty exception does not
apply. When examining the creation of the CFR Courts in 1883, it is
abundantly clear that they were created by the federal government with the
purpose of deteriorating tribal sovereignty. In McGirt v. Oklahoma123 the
Court held that even though the state of Oklahoma had been operating in
such a way that would suggest various reservations had been
disestablished, this could only be done with by an express act of Congress.
Here, there was no act of Congress that created the CFR Courts, instead
the Secretary of the Interior directed a federal agency, the BIA, to create
these courts to “civilize the Indians.”124 BIA agents subsequently issued
rules within the CFR Courts barring certain practices, such as participating
in dances and feasts or acting as medicine men.125 The CFR Courts may
have evolved over time and no longer have the objective of assimilation
but the correct test is to look “at the deepest wellsprings, not the current
exercise, of prosecutorial authority.”126
It is clear that CFR Courts do not fall within the scope of an Article
III court,127 and it is understood that CFR Courts exercise some degree of
tribal authority.128 However, these courts are considered to be a “’bare
bones’ stop-gap measure allowing a tribe to have a judicial branch until
that tribe elects to create its own court system.”129 In Sanchez Valle, the
Court found that the dual-sovereignty doctrine did not apply to Puerto
Rico, because its authority to “enact and enforce criminal law ultimately
comes from Congress.”130 States, for example, “exercise autonomous
control over criminal law . . . we treat them as separate sovereigns because
they possessed such control as an original matter, rather than deriving it
from the Federal Government.”131 Similarly, “tribal prosecution, like a
State's, is ‘attributable in no way to any delegation ... of federal
122. Id.
123. 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2467 (2020).
124. Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing
Crazy Horse, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1033 (1995); see Austin, supra note 14, at 351;
Weber, supra note 112, at 225.
125. Newton, supra note 124, at 1033–34 (1995).
126. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 68 (2016).
127. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
128. See Tillett v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 636, 640 (10th Cir. 1991) (“CFR
courts, however, also function as tribal courts; they constitute the judicial forum
through which the tribe can exercise its jurisdiction until such time as the tribe
adopts a formal law and order code.”); Smith &. Plemmons, supra note 20, at 221
(“CFR Courts are “now viewed as a vehicle for the exercise of tribal jurisdiction.”).
129. Smith &. Plemmons, supra note 20, at 222 (quoting MacArthur v.
San Juan Cty., 391 F. Supp. 2d 895, 966 (D. Utah 2005)).
130. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. at 77.
131. Id. at 74.
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authority.’”132 CFR Courts, however, are undoubtedly “attributable” to
federal authority;133 all one needs to look towards is the creation of these
Courts by the Office for Indian Affairs for the distinct reason of controlling
the “behavior and morals of Native Americans through criminal
misdemeanor charges and civil jurisdiction.”134
3. Related Statutory and Administrative Provisions
Current statutory provisions also tend to show us that CFR Courts
are attributable to federal authority. The BIA’s regulations governing CFR
Courts rejected recommendations of having only a tribal role in appointing
of judges because “Courts of Indian Offenses are Federal instrumentalities
and not tribal bodies. Federal supervision is therefore mandatory.”135
Further, it is the BIA who maintains control over appointments of judges
and prosecutors in CFR Courts.136 In Denezpi’s original pleadings in the
CFR Court, the caption stated “United States of America, Plaintiff v.
Merle Denezpi, Defendant”; the same caption was used in his district court
pleadings.137
While there is no formal congressional act establishing the CFR
Courts, Congress has implicitly approved of their creation. The
Department of the Interior created the CFR Courts’ “jurisdiction through
federal Executive Branch regulation in the Code of Federal
Regulations.”138 Some evidence of Congress’ approval of the creation of
the CFR Courts “is a [federal] statute that specifically funds training for
judges of this court.”139 While the CFR Courts certainly address tribal
matters, “the records of the court are federal property, not tribal
property.”140
The foundational factor in determining if the dual-sovereignty
doctrine applies is whether the “prosecutorial powers of the two
jurisdictions have independent origins—or . . . whether those powers
derive from the same ‘ultimate source.’”141 Contrary to the government’s
132.

Id. at 70 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 320–28

(1978)).
133. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 320.
134. Smith &. Plemmons, supra note 20, at 218.
135. 25 C.F.R. § 11.100 (2022).
136. 25 C.F.R. § 11.201-04.
137. Sentencing Order, United States v Denezpi, No. 2017-703-CR.
(Court of Indian Offenses Dec. 06, 2017); Crim. Min. Order, United States v Denezpi,
No. 2017-703-CR. (Court of Indian Offenses Dec. 6, 2017); Arraignment Hr’g Min.
Order, United States v Denezpi, No. 2017-703-CR (Court of Indian Offenses Jul. 20,
2017).
138. Smith &. Plemmons, supra note 20, at 219.
139. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012).
140. Id. (citing United States v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians,
827 F.2d 380, 383-84 (8th Cir. 1987)); United States v. Story City., Iowa, 28 F.
Supp. 3d 861, 870 (S.D. Iowa 2014)).
141. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 62 (2016) (quoting United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978)).
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desire to “vindicate” its interests, the Court has been clear that vindication
is not the test but instead it is whether the power to prosecute a defendant
derives from federal authority.142 In the case at hand, it is hard to see how
a federally appointed prosecutor going before a federally appointed judge
in a federally created and funded CFR Court to charge a defendant with a
crime under a federal code143 derives its authority from anything other than
the federal government. Thus, it seems likely that the Court will find that
the power in this case arose from the same origins, the United States.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Double Jeopardy Clause was not created to
determine whose sovereignty prevailed or which sovereign was permitted
to prosecute an individual; it was created to protect the citizens of the
United States from being punished twice for the same offense. The Court
will likely find that Denezpi was put in jeopardy twice for the same offense
and the dual-sovereignty exception does not apply. If this is the case it is
likely that some of the CFR Courts will be replaced with tribal courts to
allow tribes to prosecute defendants. Also, the federal government would
most likely have to assist tribes to expedite this process and Congress may
have to pass legislation to allow states to enter into prosecutorial
agreements with tribes.144 Ultimately, the Courts decision will help clarify
the extent of the dual-sovereignty doctrine and the protections Americans
enjoy from the Double Jeopardy Clause.

142. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320–28.
143. Denezpi was charged under in CFR Court under 25 C.F.R. §§
11.402, 11.404.
144. See generally, The Cherokee Nation and Chickasaw Nation
Criminal Jurisdiction Compacting Act of 2021, H.R. 3091, 117th Cong. (2021-2022)
(After McGirt v. United States, Congress began the process of passing a bill to allow
for Oklahoma and the Cherokee and Chickasaw to enter into a prosecutorial
agreement).

